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usiness historians, economists, and students of management have
written extensively about the contribution of entrepreneurs to the
growth of firms and the success of brands. Their studies tend to focus
on a single entrepreneur, usually the founder of a firm and creator of a
single successful product with distinctive characteristics. In this study,
we expand the definition of the entrepreneur in order to consider inno-
vative management as a kind of entrepreneurial activity. While Joseph
Schumpeter and other scholars have linked the entrepreneur with in-
vention and innovation in technology-based industries, in our analysis
we focus on marketing-based industries, where innovation relies on
other activities, such as branding, and on marketing knowledge, which
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we define as the intelligence and skills required to manage brands and
distribution channels.
To understand the trajectory of brands, we examine successful
brands in global marketing–based industries and trace their develop-
ment from the time they were created until the present day, and con-
sider the entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial managers who helped to
develop them. Successful brands are defined as those that have become
leaders (measured in terms of market share) in their product categories
in the relevant markets (domestic or global). Global brands are sold in
multiple markets using similar marketing strategies, even if in practice
only a small number of markets account for most of the sales. In this
study, a brand is understood to have undergone the shift from interna-
tional to global when its strategy for selling across different markets
has become standardized.
 
1
 
We analyze industries in which promotion of the brand relies prin-
cipally on advertising (brand image and other intangible assets), rather
than on product performance (attributable to tangible assets, such as a
high-quality production plant).
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 In such industries, conventional forms
of invention (associated with patenting) are minimal, so we must look
elsewhere for innovative behavior. Among the relevant industries are
food and drink, fashion, and cosmetics. Some examples of global brands
are Smirnoff vodka, Carlsberg beer, Perrier water, Lancôme beauty
products, Gucci fashion, Nescafé coffee, and KitKat chocolate.
 
3
 
 Some
of these are established brands, going back to the nineteenth century,
while others are more recent. Our main finding is that the long-term
success of a global brand depends not just on the individual founder’s
entrepreneurial flair, but also on the subsequent refinement and reju-
venation of the brand by entrepreneurial marketing managers in multi-
product, multinational firms.
Our choice of a group of successful brands in particular industries
leads naturally to our reason for deciding which firms to analyze: we se-
lected firms that owned such brands at particular points in time. Some
are leading multinationals, while others are small firms. As we will
show, frequently the personality-centered entrepreneurs who created
the brands are distinct from the organization-centered entrepreneurs
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In order to place a particular brand and the industry where it operates in this spectrum
of alternatives, we can use a proxy: number of patents registered each year weighted by the
size of the industry. See, for example, United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
 
Patent
Counts by Class by Year, Jan. 1977–Dec. 31, 2001.
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These brands’ rankings in the world’s top brands are listed by Interbrand in 
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who, acting in managerial positions, adapted the brands to changing
supply-and-demand conditions by refashioning them for success on the
global market.
Most of the brands we analyze changed ownership during their lives.
Many outlived the firms that first developed them. This is a consequence
of the sampling method we used, but it appears to reflect as well a basic
feature of the lives of brands in consumer-goods industries. Only a few
global brands have been owned by the same firm throughout their lives.
Most of the firms we describe are controlled by families, trusts, or a
small group of major shareholders. They have been relatively immune
to pressures from independent shareholders to maximize short-term pay-
ment of dividends. Their headquarters also tend to be located in coun-
tries where larger firms can rely on long-term support from banks, rather
than being obliged to issue equity to finance expansions, which is the
norm in some countries. Carlsberg, headquartered in Denmark, the Asahi
Brewery in Japan, and Nestlé in Switzerland are some examples.
Our study goes beyond conventional analysis of the entrepreneur’s
role in the growth of firms. The cross-industry and cross-country compar-
ison of entrepreneurial activity highlights the contributions of different
types of entrepreneurs and distinctive kinds of marketing experts in cre-
ating and developing successful global brands. We first analyze the tra-
ditional concept of entrepreneur and compare it with the expanded ver-
sion that we use here. We next track our sample of brands during their
lives, classifying cases according to type of trajectory. We then look at the
relations among stages in the lives of brands, types of entrepreneurs,
and the resources they require. In concluding, we highlight the evolving
need for different types of entrepreneurs and resources in the lives of
brands and consider how our analysis might apply to other industries.
Traditional versus Expanded Definitions of Entrepreneur
Entrepreneurship and innovation are vital forces in the develop-
ment of big business, international business, and global competitive-
ness of economies in general.
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 Yet there is little consensus about what
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entrepreneurial activity and innovation actually entail.
 
5
 
 Conventional
studies define the entrepreneur as “someone who specializes in taking
judgmental decisions about the coordination of scarce resources with
an economic aim and under conditions of uncertainty.”
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 This means
that the entrepreneur is not necessarily a capitalist or an inventor, but,
rather, is someone who is not afraid of risk and who “gets things done”
and has an economic aim.
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 Following the theme of Mark Casson’s book,
 
The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory
 
 (1982), we use an expanded
definition of the entrepreneur. Because traditional and expansive entre-
preneurs are attracted to different kinds of enterprises, each requires
different resources. Our distinction has much in common with the dis-
tinction in the managerial literature between exploratory and exploit-
ative firm behaviors.
 
8
 
 The traditional entrepreneur is exclusively an
explorer, while the expanded entrepreneur will engage in exploitation
as well.
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The traditional entrepreneur originates new products of consistent
quality and gives those products their brand names. Traditional entrepre-
neurs are usually associated with single-brand firms, especially family
businesses, which are rooted in their local environments. The expanded
entrepreneur has the capability to extend, rejuvenate, and globalize ex-
isting brands by applying a different kind of marketing knowledge. The
expanded entrepreneur may work either in a small, independent firm—
which grows into a large one—or operate in a large firm from the out-
set, normally as a marketing director or as the chief executive officer.
The traditional type of entrepreneur flourished in the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries, a period when many modern firms, except
for those in the digital economy, were established, whereas the expanded
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type began during the mid-twentieth century as established firms sought
out new markets and devised new ways of doing business, and they have
continued to expand into the twenty-first century.
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The Trajectories of Brands
In this study, we develop the concept of the “life of brands” to ex-
plain why and how, in different industries, brands emerge, evolve, and
become global, staying “forever young.” We trace the lives of brands
from their creation up to the present. However, our focus is on the pe-
riod that begins in the 1980s, when liberalization of markets took place,
world trade and foreign direct investment increased, and the waves of
global mergers accelerated. During these transformations, only a small
number of successful global brands managed to survive the impact of
these transformations and to remain independent and unchanged.
The trademark legislation that has been passed with regularity in
the major economies throughout the twentieth century has enabled
brands or trademarks to become established as legally defensible pro-
prietary names. A brand signals to consumers that the product satisfies
basic requirements for consistency and quality (“vertical differentia-
tion”) and embodies a combination of characteristics that differentiate
it from other brands (“horizontal differentiation”).
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 Firms view brands
as important mechanisms for communicating with consumers and cul-
tivating their loyalty. They sustain a continuing revenue stream by ex-
ploiting consumers’ propensity to remain loyal to a brand over the long
term, thereby adding value to the firm.
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 Brands also create “person-
alities” for products or services.
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 These personalities usually combine
performance or tangible characteristics of the product with imagery or
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intangible characteristics. In some cases, such as the automotive indus-
try, the performance aspects outweigh other characteristics of the brand’s
personality.
 
14
 
 In others, imagery predominates.
 
15
 
 This is the case of
alcoholic-beverage brands, for example, since production technologies
tend to be standardized in wines, spirits, and beer.
 
16
 
 In our account of
the evolution of firms and brands in the beauty, bottled-water, choco-
late, and fashion industries, where technological innovation does not in
itself bestow competitive advantages on a firm or guarantee that its
brand will achieve success, we will show the importance of imagery in
marketing.
We use the concept of the “life of brands” to illustrate the trajectories
of individual brands. In Table 1, we display the paths of the brands ana-
lyzed in this study, showing the industry they are from, indicating when
they were launched, and listing the various owners and countries of ori-
gin down to the present day. Ownership refers either to the personality-
centered entrepreneurs who created and developed the brands or to the
firms whose organization-centered entrepreneurial managers turned
those brands into successes on a global scale.
Table 1 illustrates four critical patterns in the lives of imagery
brands, irrespective of their industry. First, very few brands (Carlsberg
beer, Nescafé coffee, and Asahi Super Dry beer) have remained success-
ful and become global under the single ownership and management of
the entrepreneurs who created them or, in turn, of their descendants.
Second, brands may change ownership in multiple ways. They may be
traded along with the firms that own them, through mergers and acqui-
sitions. The ownership of brands may also be traded independently of
firms or transferred though licensing agreements. Third, ownership
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This route of expansion has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand,
firms may acquire large portfolios of complementary brands. On the other hand, problems of
brand rationalization may arise when brands are acquired that compete with brands in firms’
existing portfolios.
 
of modern brands is concentrated in a relatively small number of coun-
tries.
 
17
 
 The high levels of investment necessary to manage global
branded products, and the complex networks required to distribute them
worldwide, explain why these global brands are based in Western coun-
tries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Swit-
zerland, or in Japan, where organization-centered entrepreneurs have
opportunities to prove their worth and receive recognition for their suc-
cess. These are also countries where the nature of the educational
system (particularly the capability to grant specialized degrees), the rel-
ative status of entrepreneurial careers, the regulatory environment, the
religious beliefs, and the entrepreneurial culture in general are favor-
able to developing entrepreneurship.
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The fourth pattern has to do with the timing of changes in brand
ownership. There was a high turnover in the ownership of brands dur-
ing the 1980s, when the accelerating globalization of leading economies
altered the structure of global consumer-goods industries.
 
19
 
 The mar-
keting and logistical strategies of the leading firms began to converge as
they switched from a regional to a global focus. A small group of large
multinational firms with high levels of marketing knowledge began to
compete in a number of markets.
A critical goal of the corporate globalization strategy of the alcoholic-
beverages industry was the acquisition of existing regional brands con-
sidered to have the potential to become global. By acquiring these brands,
a firm could rapidly obtain market share in new geographic regions while
maintaining tight control over the amount of time and money it invested
in expansion.
 
20
 
 During this period, new opportunities appeared in some
emerging markets in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, where rising in-
comes were stimulating interest in Western lifestyles and brands.
The outcome of all these changes was that ownership of brands in
food, drink, and cosmetics became concentrated in a group of multi-
nationals: Bacardi, Diageo, Danone, Louis Vuitton Moët-Hennessy
(LVMH), Pinault-Printemps-Redoute, L’Oréal, Procter & Gamble (P&G),
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Table 1 
 
The Life of Brands
 
Industry/
Brand
Date of
Origin Ownership Country
 
Alcoholic Beverages
 
Smirnoff 1864 Vladimir Smirnoff Russia
1933 Kunnett U.S.
1939 Heublein U.S.
1987 Grand Metropolitan U.K.
1997 Diageo U.K.
Arthur Bells 1825 Thomas Sandeman U.K./Scotland
1985 Guinness U.K.
1997 Diageo U.K.
Carlsberg 1847 Carlsberg Denmark
Bombay Sapphire 1987 Grand Metropolitan U.K.
1997 Bacardi Bermuda
Corona 1925 Modelo Mexico
1998 Modelo–50% investment by
Anheuser Busch
Mexico/U.S.
Asahi Super Dry 1987 Asahi Brewery Japan
 
Bottled Water
 
Perrier 1888 Louis Perrier France
1903 Sir John Harmsworth U.K.
1947 Gustave Leven France
1990 Exor France
1992 Nestlé Switzerland
Evian 1789 Marquis de Lessert France
1829 Société Anonyme des Eaux 
Minérales d’Evian-les-Bains
France
1971 BSN France
1973 Danone (merger: BSN/
Gervais Danone)
France
 
Fashion
 
Dior 1946 Christian Dior and 
Marcel Boussac
France
1972 Sold trademark for 
fragrances and cosmetics
to Moët Hennessy
France
1978 Agache-Willot France
1984 Financière Agache
(Bernard Arnault)
France
1988 LVMH— Financière Agache France
Gucci 1881/1921 Guccio Gucci Italy
1987 50% Gucci Family, 50% InvestCorp Italy/Bahrain
1993 100% InvestCorp Bahrain
1996 Fully publicly quoted —
1999 Pinault-Printemps-Redoute France
 
(continued)
 Unilever, and Nestlé. This small circle of firms owns many of the world’s
most valuable brands.
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Strategies for Global Success: Single-Firm Brands
Some brands become globally successful while remaining under
the management of the personality-centered entrepreneurs who cre-
ated them (often the founders of firms) or their descendants. Other
brands only become successful when they change ownership and are
managed by organization-centered entrepreneurs, rather than by those
who created them.
 
Table 1 (continued)
 
Industry/
Brand
Date of
Origin Ownership Country
 
Fragrances and Upscale Cosmetics
 
Lâncome 1935 Lâncome France
1965 L’Oréal France
Helena Rubinstein 1902 Helena Rubinstein Australia
1979 Colgate U.S.
1980 Albi Enterprises U.S.
1984 Palac (51%) 
 
!
 
 L’Oréal (49%) U.S./France
1987 L’Oréal (100%) France
Hugo Boss 1923 Hugo Boss Germany
1994 Procter & Gamble–Licensing
agreement
U.S.
Calvin Klein 1968 Barry Schawtz and Calvin Klein U.S.
1989 Unilever–licensing agreement U.K./Netherlands
1995 Coty Inc.–licensing agreement U.S.
 
Coffee
 
Nescafé 1938 Nestlé Switzerland
Starbucks 1971 Starbucks (Bowker and Baldwin) U.S.
1987 Il Giornale (Howard Schultz) U.S.
 
Chocolate
 
KitKat 1935 Rowntree U.K.
1969 Rowntree merger with Mackintosh U.K.
1988 Nestlé Switzerland
Cadbury 1824 Cadbury U.K.
1919 Merger of Cadbury and J. S. Fry
and Son
U.K.
 
1969
 
Cadbury merger with Schweppes
 
U.K.
Sources: Various companies’ archives, histories, newspaper articles, annual reports and
accounts.
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Johnson & Johnson and Colgate-Palmolive are also listed in this group of multinationals.
Interbrand, 
 
Best Global
 
 
 
Brands 2006: A Ranking by Brand by Value
 
 (2006).
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Brands Created and Retained by Small High-Growth Firms. Ex-
amples of brands that became successful and global under the manage-
ment of their original entrepreneurs or their descendants are the Danish
beer Carlsberg and the fashion brand Gucci. But there are differences in
how they developed. Carlsberg achieved international success soon
after it was created, while Gucci did not manage to do so until several
years after its creation. However, neither one became a global brand
until after its original entrepreneur had died.
Carlsberg beer was produced for the first time in 1847 after Jacob
Christian Jacobsen created a new lager beer that was stronger and of bet-
ter quality than its competitors in Denmark.22 The early success of the
brand Carlsberg is associated not only with its domestic market but
also with its exports. The firm started exporting to the United Kingdom
in 1868. By the end of the twentieth century, Carlsberg had become one
of the most global beer brands. Currently, around 95 percent of Carls-
berg sales are generated outside the home market.23 After World War II,
the firm started intense marketing campaigns to sell more beer abroad.24
Between 1958 and 1972, exports tripled, and Carlsberg established brew-
eries in Europe and Asia. In 1969 Carlsberg merged with its major Dan-
ish competitor, Tuborg.25 The company launched several slogans, one
of which was “Carlsberg—Probably the best lager in the world,” in the
1970s.26 The company’s ads still emphasize the international prestige of
the brand and continue Jacobsen’s tradition of stressing the firm’s her-
itage and the product’s high quality.27
The fashion brand Gucci also became successful while its creator
was alive, although not until later in his life. The House of Gucci was
22 One of those competitors was Jacobsen’s son, Carl Jacobsen, who established a produc-
tion unit in an annex of the J. C. Jacobsen plant in 1871, producing a beer branded as Ny
Carlsberg. Carl’s use of a similar brand name led J. C. Jacobsen to sue his son. Both breweries
were united under the same ownership—a foundation—in 1902, after the death of both father
and son. Kristof Glamann, Jacobsen of Carlsberg: Brewer and Philanthropist (Copenhagen,
1991), 216–17.
23 In 2005 Carlsberg sold 3.4 million hectoliters of beer in Denmark out of a total of 68.9
million hectoliters sold. Carlsberg, Annual Report and Accounts, 2005.
24 Glamann, Jacobsen of Carlsberg. For instance, Carlsberg had around 42 percent to 44
percent of the Danish market in the 1920s.
25 In 1968 it made its first investment in a foreign market by setting up brewing opera-
tions in Malawi, and in 1969 it created its first licensing agreement in Cyprus. An important
step in its internationalization strategy was a joint venture launched with Grand Metropoli-
tan in 1974 to sell Carlsberg in the United Kingdom, during a period when tastes were chang-
ing to lighter beers in that market. United Breweries Ltd., Annual Reports and Accounts,
1969–70, 1970–71, 1975–76.
26 This slogan was launched in the United Kingdom in 1975 using a voiceover by Orson
Wells. United Breweries, Annual Report and Accounts, 1975–76.
27 Interview with Bjarre Maurer, Carlsberg Communications, Copenhagen 18 May 2001;
United Breweries, Annual Reports and Accounts, 1969–70; Carlsberg, Annual Report and
Accounts, 2005.
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founded as a saddlery shop in Florence in 1881, but Guccio Gucci did
not start producing luxury luggage until the 1920s, when he learned
that his clients were gradually replacing equine transportation with
horseless carriages and that luggage was beginning to function as a
symbol of affluence and taste. In the 1950s, Gucci diversified into other
luxury items, such as ties, shoes, and handbags equipped with bamboo
handles. After his death in 1953, his family took the successful company
to new heights by opening stores in fashionable locations, such as Paris,
Beverly Hills, London, Palm Beach, and Tokyo.28 During the 1980s,
after the brand had been undermined by family disagreements and over-
licensing, it was sold to InvestCorp in Bahrain, which failed to improve
its global image. In the 1990s, under new ownership, Gucci was restored
to its place at the center of chic accessories. In the late 1990s, respond-
ing to the threat of acquisition by Bernard Arnauld, owner of LVMH,
the managers sold the firm to another French multinational, Pinault-
Printemps-Redoute, which invested heavily in promoting Gucci’s global
image.29
Brands Created by Large Multibrand Firms. Carlsberg and Gucci
both exemplify brands that were created by small firms that retained
ownership of a single brand and eventually delegated control of the
brand to professional teams. The controlling family successfully made
the transition from personality-centered to organization-centered entre-
preneurs over several generations (although the Gucci family finally
sold out its shares). Other brands, however, were created by large firms
that already controlled one or more existing brands. In such cases, it
was the organization-centered entrepreneurs running these firms who
adapted their organizations in order to foster “intrapreneurship,” thereby
enhancing their capabilities to create new brands. The advantage of in-
novation by a large firm is that, once the brand takes off, the firm al-
ready has access to the skills and capital required to rejuvenate and
globalize, and may even manage to apply what it has learned to the
management of other products.
It might be expected, however, that brands created by teams of
managers led by organization-centered entrepreneurs are not as radi-
cally innovative as those created by successful smaller firms, and the
evidence supports this supposition. The newly created brands often re-
semble existing brands possessed by the firm, and may, for certain pur-
poses, be seen as natural extensions of them. The case of Asahi Super
28 Paola Trimarco, Gucci: Business in Fashion (London, 2001); Gerard McKnight, Gucci:
A House Divided (New York, 1987); Sara G. Forden, The House of Gucci: A Sensational
Story of Murder, Madness, Glamour, and Greed (New York, 2001).
29 “Don’t Mix Your Designers,” Economist, 14 Jan. 1999; “Cockfight,” Economist, 25 Mar.
1999; “Premium Blend,” Economist, 22 Oct. 2004.
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Dry, discussed below, illustrates this outcome. In contrast, Nescafé and
KitKat were radical innovations that bore little relation to their cre-
ators’ existing brand portfolios.
An entrepreneurial chief executive officer of a large firm may au-
thorize his marketing department to conduct research for the purpose
of identifying emerging, as yet unfilled, product niches. The newly dis-
covered niches can then be filled either by the extension of an existing
brand (as occurred in the case of Asahi Super Dry), or by the creation of
a new brand, or by forging a compromise between the two (as occurred
in the case of Nescafé, described below). The firm may also hire new
managers and consultants in order to boost temporarily the creative re-
sources at the firm’s disposal (as happened in the case of KitKat). A
permanent solution may be obtained by changing the firm’s recruit-
ment policies and hiring new managers with stronger entrepreneurial
capabilities.
The Japanese beer Asahi Super Dry, which was launched in 1987 by
Asahi Brewery as an extension of Asahi Draft beer, was based on a revo-
lutionary innovation that was product based (its ingredients and pro-
duction process were new). In the late 1980s, the Japanese beer indus-
try was experiencing a variety of demographic, dietary, social, economic,
and distribution changes that affected the demand for beer. Whereas
Japanese consumers traditionally exhibited strong brand loyalty and
conservative tastes, modern drinkers were eager to try new types of
beer.30 This period was also a difficult one for the firm, which was on
the edge of bankruptcy and was therefore sufficiently desperate to risk
a frontal attack on the industry leader, Kirin. Asahi Super Dry targeted
an unexploited niche of the Japanese market for koku-kire (rich and
crisp taste) with the slogan “rich in taste and yet also sharp and refresh-
ing.” The result was that sales levels not only surpassed those of the
other brands owned by the firm but also propelled Asahi Brewery to
the first place in sales among Japan’s top beer brand in 2002.31
Nescafé soluble coffee exemplifies another global brand that was
launched by a team of managers in a large multibrand multinational.32
30 Asahi Brewery, Annual Report and Accounts, 1988; Tim Craig, “The Japanese Beer
Wars: Initiating and Responding to Hyper-Competition in New Product Development,” Or-
ganization Science 7, no. 3 (1996): 302–21.
31 Kirin, Annual Report and Accounts, 1966; “Asahi Pushes Kirin out of Pole Position,”
Financial Times (21 Feb. 2002); “Japan’s Beer Wars,” Economist, 26 Feb. 1998.
32 Henri Nestlé started producing infant formula in 1843 in Switzerland. He tried to sell
to doctors, pharmacists, and hospitals, but mothers first started using his formula after there
was evidence that it had saved a premature baby. In 1905 Nestlé merged with the Anglo-
Swiss Condensed Milk Company and throughout the 1920s and 1930s continued acquiring
other companies. After World War II, Nestlé diversified first by creating an alliance with the
chocolate producer Vevey, and subsequently by merging with this firm. In 1947 the firm
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Beginning in the late nineteenth century with the development of mod-
ern consumer society, entrepreneurs made several attempts to produce
a soluble coffee in response to the demand for troop supplies during
the First World War. However, the products that were generated failed
to match the aroma of coffee arising from freshly roasted beans, were
not durable, were too expensive, and did not dissolve satisfactorily in
liquid.33
Nescafé was created by the Swiss company Nestlé in 1938.34 The
new brand resulted from a combination of motivations within the firm
and external opportunities. Nestlé was entering a phase of economic cri-
sis as a result of its heavy investment in two major market segments—
mothers and babies.35 The company’s management felt it was time to
find a product that would appeal to men.36 Nestlé had had investments
in the Brazilian market since the 1920s. In the early 1930s, the board of
directors of the Banque Française et Italienne pour l’Amérique, which
wanted to make use of the bank’s excess Brazilian stocks, turned to
Nestlé’s management for help in fostering coffee consumption.37 Nestlé’s
laboratories appointed two chemists, Arnold Bakke and Max Morgen-
thaler, to oversee research designed to produce a dry-coffee extract that
could be prepared instantly. After investing four years in the project
with no success, Nestlé abandoned the project. However, Morgenthaler
continued the experiments independently and came up with a workable
formula for instant coffee in 1936. Once Nestlé’s directors were shown
his findings, they decided to go ahead with the product.38 As soon as it
was launched in 1938, Nescafé instant coffee quickly became popular.39
merged with Maggi (a large Swiss multinational famous for its sauces and soups). This
merger opened Nestlé’s business to world markets. See Jean Heer, Nestlé: One Hundred
Twenty Five Years (Vevey, 1991); Roger Priouret, “Comment la Suisse acquit une industrie
alimentaire de dimension mondiale,” Le Figaro, 6 Sept. 1966; “Global Confederation Where
the Whip Is Seldom Cracked—Nestlé Alimentana S.A.,” Financial Times, 16 July 1969.
33 Albert Pfiffner, “A Real Winner One Day: The Development of Nescafé in the 1930s,” in
Genuss und Nüchternheit: Geschichte des Kaffees in der Schweiz vom 18, ed. Roman Ross-
feld (Baden, 2002).
34 “Rapport au Conseil d’Administration, Séance du 10 Juin 1928 à Cham,” Nestlé Histor-
ical Archive.
35 Heer, Nestlé.
36 Letter from E. Muller (vice president of Nestlé) to J. W. Gwynn (managing director of
N.M.P. Ltd.), 15 Apr. 1937; Nestlé Historical Archive.
37 Letter from E. Muller to H. Kuhlmann, Rio de Janeiro, 18 Mar. 1937, SG 11 541, Nestlé
Historical Archive.
38 M. Morgenthaler, “La Naissance du Nescafé,” Bulletin Nestlé no. 2 (1944); “Cinquante
ans de Nescafé!” Nestlé Gazette (Apr. 1988).
39 “Rapport au Conseil d’Administration, Séance du 10 Juin 1938 à Cham,” Nestlé Ar-
chive; “Roasters Turn to Soluble Coffee Business: Roasters Caught in Prize Squeeze Find Sol-
ubles a Possible Solution,” Tea and Coffee Trade (Mar. 1953); “Soluble Coffee: What Caused
Phenomenal Sales Increases?” Tea and Coffee Trade (May 1953).
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KitKat is another good example of a brand launched by a firm that
was going through a difficult period but overcame its internal problems
by hiring new managers and bringing in consultants.40 The aim was to
create a line that did not directly compete with Cadbury chocolate.41
KitKat was created by Rowntree in 1935 and was initially branded
“Chocolate Crisp” before being renamed in 1937.42 During the 1930s,
Rowntree was facing the prospect of bankruptcy, so the firm hired new
professional managers, one of whom was George Harris, a member of
the Rowntree family by marriage. Emulating the successful strategy of
the American company that had launched Mars in the British market in
1932, Harris created new brands for niche markets. Aided by the new
technique of market research and the flair of the J. Walter Thompson
advertising agency, Rowntree introduced an array of winning confec-
tionary products, one of which was KitKat, and created new alliances
A 1939 advertisement for Nestlé. (From the Nestlé Historical Archives, Vevey, Switzerland.
Permission granted by Nestlé SA.) 
40 “Chairman’s Reports on York to General Board, 1933–1935,” R/B/2/2, Rowntree Ar-
chive, Borthwick Library.
41 “Notes by WW on the Achievement of the Business in 1932 in sales and profits, and the
factors contributing,” R/B4/WW/1, Rowntree Archive.
42 The brand KitKat was first registered by Rowntree in 1911 and subsequently renewed in
different periods (1925, 1939, 1953, 1967). “Register relating to applications for the Registra-
tion of Trademarks,” R/DP/F/19, Rowntree Archive.
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with competitors in foreign markets.43 By the outbreak of World War
II, Rowntree had undergone a marketing revolution and had recouped
much of the ground it had earlier lost to rivals.44 Rowntree began to ex-
tend its international reach after 1945, not only through exports but
also through foreign direct investment in markets such as Australia,
Canada, South Africa, and Ireland.45 By the early 1950s, the firm had
grown to a size that required the formation of separate product divi-
sions, each with a different marketing manager (confectionary, grocery,
and chocolate) and guided by marketing-strategy committees.46 How-
ever, Rowntree failed to diversify successfully in the 1960s, a decade dur-
ing which the confectionary market stagnated and international com-
petition intensified. In 1969, Rowntree merged with Mackintosh, another
confectioner that produced brands like Rolo and Quality Street.47 As
occurred in the merger between Cadbury and Schweppes, this newly
amalgamated firm anticipated melding two strongly marketing-oriented
companies in confectionary and grocery and obtaining economies in
marketing, distribution, and production planning.48 Rowntree-Macintosh
was acquired by Nestlé in 1988 in a hostile takeover. Despite its respect-
able financial performance and its innovative record, Rowntree’s stock-
market performance was perceived as inadequate, and the general view
was that the company could have done better over the past twenty
years.49 The high price Nestlé paid for Rowntree’s shares reflected the
company’s powerful brands and their potential to expand profitably
into world markets. The acquisition by a leading multinational in choc-
olate paved the way for the brand KitKat to become global.50
The “Big-Firm Umbrella.” A small firm that lacks large-firm ca-
pabilities to develop the brand it has created may find it more convenient
43 Correspondence regarding Rowntree-Nestlé USA negotiations, “Letter from C. W. Gil-
derdale to L. Owen and J. D. Watson,” 14 July 1934, Rowntree Archive.
44 Other brands launched in this period were Aero, Smarties, and Black Magic chocolates.
Robert Fitzgerald, Rowntree and the Marketing Revolution, 1862–1969 (Cambridge, 1995).
45 “File with Information about Overseas and Exports Division,” R/DH/SC/16, Rowntree
Archive.
46 Letter from 1952 regarding the retirement of G. J. Harris, R/B3/LO/1, Rowntree Archive.
47 Letter from Donald Barron (chairman of Rowntree) to the shareholders of Mackintosh
announcing the merger (22 May 1969), R/BJ/BJB/4, Rowntree Archive; “Rowntree and
Company and John Mackintosh and Sons Limited—Press Release,” 2 Apr. 1969, R/B2/5,
Rowntree Archive.
48 “Rowntree and Company and John Mackintosh and Sons Limited—Press Release,” 2
Apr. 1969, Rowntree Archive; D. Thomas, “How Rowntree Matched Macintosh,” Manage-
ment Today (Sept. 1970): 102–56; T. A. B. Corley, “Best Practice Marketing Food and Health
Drinks in Britain, 1930–70,” in Adding Value: Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink,
eds. Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J. Morgan (London, 1994).
49 “The Nestlé Takeover of Rowntree,” Inquiry into Corporate Takeovers in the United
Kingdom (Edinburgh, 1991).
50 Heer, Nestlé, 449–57; “Nestlé Offers £2.1 Billion for Rowntree,” Herald Tribune, 27
Apr. 1988.
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to operate under a “big-firm umbrella” than to attempt to “go it alone.”
An experienced large firm may inject capital into the small firm through
long-term trade credit, a loan, or a minority equity stake. In return for
interest payments and a share of the profits, the large firm gives the
small one access to its international marketing and distribution net-
work. An example of this strategy is the Mexican beer brand Corona,
produced since 1925 by Modelo, which began to experience rapid inter-
national growth in the 1980s, when it formed alliances with the Amer-
ican brewer Anheuser Busch. In 1998, the multinational acquired a
50 percent nonvoting stake in Corona’s Grupo Modelo, which owned
the leading beer brand in Mexico. Thus, aided by Anheusher Busch,
which distributes the brand in most of the states, Corona became the
foremost imported beer brand in the United States.51
Strategies for Global Success: Multifirm Brands
The brands listed in Table 1 tend to change ownership in two main
ways: by merger and acquisition or by contract. Brand ownership has
changed most commonly through mergers and acquisitions. When the
shift occurs through acquisitions, one firm obtains control over the net
assets and operations of another, whereas mergers enable the share-
holders to pool their assets and jointly to control them.52 The food, drink,
and cosmetics industries have resorted more often to acquisitions than
to mergers. Contractual arrangements may involve either the sale or
the licensing of the brand.
Acquisitions by Organization-Centered Entrepreneurs. Starbucks
coffee, Perrier water, Evian water, Lâncome, and Helena Rubinstein
are examples of brands that only achieved global success after changing
ownership and subsequently being managed by entrepreneurs who ac-
quired them from their creators (or successors of their creators).
Starbucks is a relatively young coffee brand, which was created in
1971 by three entrepreneurs, Gordon Bowker, Zev Siegel, and Jerry
Baldwin, who began selling it as a high-quality beverage in Seattle. An-
other entrepreneur, Howard Schultz, who at the time worked in a dif-
ferent business, realized that the baby boomers in the United States were
starting to reject prepackaged food in favor of more natural, higher-
quality products. In 1981 Schultz contacted the Seattle company to in-
quire about the possibility of transforming it into a high-quality na-
tional business and recreating the Italian café-bar culture in the American
51 Anheuser Busch, Annual Report and Accounts, 2005; “Modelo Sharpens Overseas Focus
and it Rides Bumpy Road in the U.S.,” Impact, 15 Nov. 2005.
52 International Accounting Standards (Rochester, 1996).
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market. Starbucks’ management hired Schultz, but he left in 1983 to
start his own coffee chain, which he called Il Giornale. In 1987, Star-
bucks came up for sale, and Schultz bought it and began to internation-
alize the brand. His grasp of changing social trends led him to promote
the idea of selling premium coffee in a relaxed, informal retail environ-
ment. The success of this powerful brand was a key factor in the cre-
ation of a mass market for specialty coffee.53
In 1898, Louis Perrier, a medical researcher and proponent of the
virtues of thermal water, applied for a variety of patents and established
the Société des Eaux Minérales, Boissons et Produits Hygiéniques de
Vergèze. In 1903, using English capital, the firm initially sold Perrier in
England and across the British Empire. Only in 1933 did it turn to the
French market, merging in 1936 with Eaux Minérales de Vergèze. In
1947 it was acquired by Gustave Leven, who, by merging with and ac-
quiring other water springs and advertising on a mass scale, revolution-
ized the bottled-water business and caught up with his main competi-
tors, Evian and Vittel.54
In the mid-1970s, Leven took the brand to the United States, ignor-
ing the advice of several consulting firms that proclaimed it would be
foolish to try to sell sparkling water in the land of Coca Cola and “gin-
and-tonic” drinkers. The saturation of the French market and cam-
paigns in the American market against soft drinks with added sugar
were strong incentives for this investment decision. Perrier’s immedi-
ate success created a substantial market in the United States for bottled
water.55 The marketing of Perrier positioned it as a status drink for the
fashionable and affluent.56
The opportunities afforded by the global potential of the brand,
coupled with the high cost of transporting and distributing a bulky,
low-value product like water, created a strategic need to control inter-
national distribution. Perrier therefore began to acquire water firms
that held dominant positions in other foreign markets. For instance, in
1980 Perrier group acquired several American bottled-water firms,
each with a strong regional presence, such as Poland Spring Corp. and
Calistoga Mineral Water Co., in order to reduce the costs of shipping
53 Howard Schultz and Dori Jones Yang, Pour Your Heart into It: How Starbucks Built a
Company One Cup at a Time (New York, 1997); “Howard Schultz and Starbucks Coffee Com-
pany,” in Nancy F. Koehn, Brand New: How Entrepreneurs Earned Consumers’ Trust from
Wedgwood to Dell (Cambridge, Mass., 2001).
54 Douglas A Simmons, Schweppes: The First Two Hundred Years (Ascott, 1983); Gilles
de Bure, Perrier by Perrier (Barcelona, 2001); “Chantée par Valéry,” L’Éxpress, 28 June
1965; “De l’eau minérale au conditionnement: Le groupe Perrier a realisé sa proper verrerie à
Vergèze,” Les Echos, 15 May 1974.
55 “Perrier: Soif d’OPE,” Le Figaro: Économie, 6 Mar. 1989.
56 Business Trend Analysis, “The Bottled Water Market,” 1986.
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water over great distances. Leven also continued to invest heavily in
marketing, creating advertisements such as “De l’eau qui fait Pschitt”
(the water that fizzes).57 In 1992 Perrier was acquired by Nestlé after
Leven retired, and the brand began to lose ground.58 During the nine-
ties, Nestlé turned Perrier into a global brand and invested more in the
bottled-water business by acquiring sources such as San Pellegrino min-
eral water. In 1999 Nestlé started rolling out its Nestlé Pure Life bottled
water, and in 2003 the company acquired Powwow, one of the leading
players in the home and office water-delivery business in Europe, and
also Clear Water, a bottled-water home- and-office-delivery company
located in Russia.
Evian bottled water is another example of a brand that was devel-
oped after a firm was purchased. Evian water is differentiated from
most other bottled-water brands, in that the product is not filtered or
processed in any way. Source Cachet, the spring from which Evian is
obtained, was discovered in 1789 near Mont Blanc in France. Soon after
this discovery, a health resort was constructed at the site. The beverage
was first bottled in 1826; its source was the Chablais foothills in the
Haute Savoie region of France. Until the mid-twentieth century, Evian
was sold in pharmacies and could only be bought with a medical pre-
scription. Not until the 1960s in France, the mid-1970s in other coun-
tries, did bottled water undergo the surge in popularity that carried the
brand to international fame.59 By 1969, Evian was suffering from a de-
pressed equity market in France, and its sales were hampered by the
price controls imposed on mineral waters. Eventually it was acquired
by BSN (Boussois-Soucho-Neuvesel), whose management had exten-
sive marketing capabilities.60 At the time, this firm produced glass bot-
tles, industrial containers, flagons, and table glassware. However, BSN
managers recognized that the company was losing its competitive edge
in the glass-bottle industry, and so they decided to diversify into the con-
tents of their containers, such as water and beer. In 1973 BSN merged
with Danone, which started to develop the water business globally.61
57 “Competition Stiffens for Perrier,” Herald Tribune, 1 Nov. 1988.
58 The European Commission ruled that the company should dispose of Volvic. Volvic
was then acquired by the French group BSN, which already had Évian and Badoit. “Bruxelles
joue les sourciers avec Perrier,” La Croix L’Événement, 24 July 1992; “Perrier devra vivre
sans le flair de Gustave Leven,” La Tribune de L’Expansion, 2 July 1990.
59 “Le Français est Buveur d’Eau,” L’Express, 31 Mar. 1960; “Le Revanche des Buveurs
d’Eau,” Le Nouvel Observateur, 23 Nov. 1989.
60 “Les Sociétés d’Eaux Minerals et la Bourse,” Les Echos, 21 May 1969; “La Bataille de
l’Eau Minérale,” Journal des Finances, 7 Apr. 1989.
61 In 1970, as part of its diversification strategy into the production of the contents of bot-
tles, BSN also acquired two breweries: Kronenbourg and the European Breweries Company.
Business Trend Analysis, “The Bottled Water Market,” 1986; Bankers Trust, “Bottled Water:
Pan European—Food Producers,” 1999.
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Since then, Evian’s management has invested in globalizing the brand
and has adopted innovative approaches to bottling water. The company
was the first to develop plastic bottles in 1978, to switch to plastic screw-
tops in 1984, and to introduce handles on the packages in 1988. These
and other innovations allowed Evian to grow, even during periods of
stagnant consumption.62 Currently Evian is the number-one selling
brand of noncarbonated bottled water in the world.63
Lancôme cosmetics is another example of a brand that became glo-
bally successful only after it changed ownership. The brand was created
in 1935 by French entrepreneur Arman Petitjean, who had studied with
François Coty, the “father of twentieth century luxury perfumes.”64 He
launched his first five fragrances in 1935 at the Universal Exhibition in
Brussels, where they immediately captured popular interest. Building
upon this initial success, Petitjean soon expanded beyond his perfume
line to offer a complete range of products, including makeup and skin-
care products. During the years that followed, Lancôme’s prestige spread
throughout the world, and its products began to be sold in the United
States in the 1950s, answering a growing desire for quality cosmetics.
However, not until 1964, when the brand was acquired by L’Oréal, did
it become global.65 This achievement was the result of sophisticated,
careful strategies that entailed selling Lancôme through selected chan-
nels of distribution in France and abroad.66
The personality-centered entrepreneur Helena Rubinstein opened
her first beauty salon in Melbourne, Australia, at the beginning of the
twentieth century and then went on to expand her line. Rubinstein was
determined to internationalize her brand, and her innovations had a
strong impact on the cosmetics industry in the twentieth century. She
was the first to sell cosmetics in large department stores; she created
the first waterproof mascara (in 1939); and she was also the first to add
vitamins to cosmetics (vitamin C, vitamin A, and phosphorus). In the
1950s Helena Rubinstein, along with Elizabeth Arden, was among
62 “Eaux Minerals: La Crise du Pétrole Grignote les Profits et les Consommateurs Contes-
tent l’Utilité des Produits Nouveaux,” Les Echos, 6 Sept. 1974; “Evian: La bouteille com-
pactable pour faire la différence,” La Tribune, 1 Feb. 1995.
63 KeyNote, “Bottled Water: Market Assessment,” 2005.
64 Randall Bruce Monsen, A Century of Perfume: The Perfumes of François Coty (At-
lanta, 2001).
65 Hubert Bonin, Carole Pailhé, and Nadine Polakowski, “The French Touch: Interna-
tional Beauty and Health Care at L’Oréal (since 1907),” in Transnational Companies, eds.
Hubert Bonin et al. (Paris, 2001); François Dalle, L’Aventure L’Oréal (Paris, 2001); Geoffrey
Jones et al., “L’Oréal and the Globalization of American Beauty,” Harvard Business School
Case 805-086 (Boston, 2005).
66 The different channels of distribution corresponded both to distinct economic levels
and to different purchasing habits. Jones et al., “L’Oréal and the Globalization of American
Beauty.”
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the most popular suppliers of luxury beauty products in the United
States.67 However, by the early 1980s, the brand was being sold cheaply
in U.S. drugstores and was receiving little merchandising support.68 Its
position was much better outside the United States, particularly in Eu-
rope, Japan, and Asia, where it was still considered an upscale brand.
Throughout the 1980s, its various owners, such as Colgate Palmolive
and Albi International, did not invest in maintaining the elite image of
the brand. L’Oréal acquired Helena Rubinstein in 1987 as part of a
strategy to cover all segments of the beauty market, and transformed it
into a truly global luxury brand.69 However, it took ten years for the
changes in international distribution strategy to become effective.70
Merger of Large Firms. The merger of Cadbury and Schweppes
illustrates the advantages to owners of combining resources. Cadbury
began in 1824 as a shop in the center of Birmingham selling products
such as tea, coffee, cocoa, and mustard. In 1831 John Cadbury decided
to concentrate on manufacturing and marketing cocoa, so he sold the
shop to a relative and launched the firm that became Cadbury Brothers
in 1847. The company’s first major breakthrough came in 1866, when
the second generation of Cadbury Brothers introduced an improved co-
coa in Britain.71 Cadbury built up a large export trade in chocolate and
confectionary before 1914; after World War I it invested in overseas
manufacturing in the British Empire and the Commonwealth.72 In 1919
Cadbury merged with J. S. Fry & Son, a family firm that dated back to
1728 and was the leading company in the industry.73 The first directors
who were not family members were appointed in 1943; the firm was not
floated on the stock market until 1962. By 1960, low product growth and
intense competition from rivals compelled the Cadbury management to
diversify into sugar confectionary, cakes, and convenience foods. Unable
67 Helena Rubinstein, My Life for Beauty (New York, 1966); Patrick O’Higgins, Madame:
An Intimate Biography of Helena Rubinstein (New York, 1971).
68 Lindy Woodhead, War Paint: Madame Helena Rubinstein and Miss Elizabeth Arden:
Their Lives, Their Times, Their Rivalry (Chichester, 2004); Kathy Peiss, Hope in a Jar: The
Making of America’s Beauty Culture (Kinlough, 1999).
69 In the 1960s, only 3 percent of its volume of sales was in foreign markets. In 2000 over
50 percent of its sales occurred outside Europe. L’Oréal’s transformation of local brands into
global brands had two stages that took about ten years overall: during the first stage, brands
were chosen that had the potential to become global. To progress to the next stage, the brand
had to sell to a critical mass. “Comment L’Oréal Mondialise,” Le Figaro: Économie, 29 Oct.
2001.
70 Interview with Jean-Claude Le Grand, Marketing Manager for L’Oréal, Paris, 10 June
2002; “Béatrice Dautresme: La potion magique d’Helena Rubinstein,” Le Figaro, 2 Nov. 1999.
71 “Introducing Cadbury Schweppes, 1969,” Cadbury Archive; J. A. Williams, The Firm of
Cadbury, 1831–1931 (London, 1931), 5–40.
72 Geoffrey Jones, “Multinational Chocolate: Cadbury Overseas, 1918–1939,” Business
History 26, no.1 (1984): 59–76.
73 “Talk Given by Sir Egbert Cadbury” (South Africa, 1965), Cadbury Archive; Williams,
The Firm of Cadbury.
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to generate sufficient product diversity internally, Adrian Cadbury merged
his company with Schweppes in 1969, a move that allowed the combined
firms to achieve economies in distribution and product development.74
Brands Sold as Pieces of Intellectual Property. The gin Bombay
Sapphire is an example of a brand that was sold by the firm that owned
it but continued to trade independently of the new owner. Bombay Sap-
phire was launched in 1987 by International Distillers and Vintners
(IDV), which became a subsidiary of Grand Metropolitan. In trying to
capture market share, Grand Metropolitan came up with an innovative
design (a blue bottle) and a new recipe that contained added ingredi-
ents, such as large doses of spice and lemon, making it more attractive
than competitor brands, such as Gordon.75 The brand changed owner-
ship when Grand Metropolitan merged with Guinness, another leading
British alcoholic-beverage multinational, to become Diageo, whose dom-
inance of the market raised antitrust concerns in the United States. To
A 1952 Cadbury advertisement. (From the Cadbury Archives, University of Birmingham,
England. Permission granted by Cadbury Schweppes plc.)
74 “Schweppes Plus Cadbury,” Times, 30 Jan. 1969; Derek F. Channon, The Strategy and
Structure of British Enterprise (London, 1973); Corley, “Best Practice Marketing of Food and
Health Drinks in Britain, 1930–70”; G. Foster, “The Cadbury Schweppes Mix,” Management
Today (Apr. 1970): 64–73.
75 Interview with Chris Searle, Global Marketing Manager for Bombay-Bacardi and
former brand manager at International Distillers and Vintners, London, 22 Jan. 2004.
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avoid a confrontation with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Dia-
geo’s management decided to sell Bombay.76 The brand was bought by
Bacardi in 1998, the year after the merger of Grand Metropolitan and
Guinness.77
This sale mainly involved the intellectual property represented by
the name of the brand, although some stocks and the recipe were traded
too. Bacardi retained the essential components of the brand: the dis-
tinctive bottle, the recipe, and the ingredients. However, the company
introduced major changes elsewhere, speeding up the distribution pro-
cess and enhancing the premium image by advertising heavily and
charging higher prices.78 The global sales of Bombay grew from 0.5 mil-
lion bottles in 1998 to 1.4 million bottles in 2004.79 The move to a
smaller multinational resulted in the brand’s becoming a relatively im-
portant item in the firm’s portfolio, and as a result it was given more at-
tention by top management than it had received from Bombay.
Transfer through Licensing Agreements. The fragrances Calvin
Klein, Hugo Boss, and Dior exemplify the partial transfer of control of a
brand through a licensing agreement, giving one firm the rights to pro-
duce and distribute a product originated by another for a certain num-
ber of years in a specified set of countries.
Calvin Klein is known for its designer jeans and its wholesome all-
American look. Over the years, Calvin Klein diversified into related busi-
nesses, such as underwear, fragrances, swimwear, home décor, and cos-
metics. It entered the fragrance market with the launch of fragrances
for men: Obsession in 1981 and Eternity in 1988. During this period, the
perfume industry was catching on to the image of the sensitive, success-
ful 1980s man, and it responded by offering men their own fragrances.
In 1989, Unilever signed a licensing agreement to produce Calvin Klein
fragrances under the Calvin Klein brand. Even though this business ap-
peared to present international growth opportunities, in 2005 Unilever
disposed of these licenses as part of its strategy to withdraw from pre-
mium cosmetics (it had sold Elizabeth Arden in 2001). Under the own-
ership of Unilever, the brand became global. The license was then ac-
quired by Coty Inc., a large U.S. cosmetics family firm, which became
the world’s largest manufacturer of mass-market fragrances.80
Hugo Boss has been a globally successful brand name in men’s ap-
parel since 1923. In the wake of the increase in men’s willingness to
76 Interview with Jack Keenan, former CEO of Diageo, London, 31 Oct. 2003.
77 The two brands were acquired by Bacardi for £1.15 billion (US$1.9 billion) in 1998.
78 Interview with Chris Searle, global marketing manager for Bombay Sapphire, Bacardi,
London, 22 Jan. 2004.
79 M. Shaken Communications, Inc., Impact International: Databank (New York, 2006).
80 Geoffrey Jones, Renewing Unilever: Transformation and Tradition 
Entrepreneurship and the Development of Global Brands / 673
wear fragrances, Hugo Boss entered into a licensing agreement with the
American consumer-products giant Procter & Gamble in 1993, which
entitled P&G to produce fragrances with the Hugo Boss brand name.
This was P&G’s first investment in the fragrance business, and the move
propelled the company toward global leadership in men’s fragrances.81
The perfume Dior provides a similar story. Dior is a brand created
after World War II that became very fashionable soon after it was
launched, symbolizing luxury rather than comfort. During the 1970s,
the brand was diminished by the firm’s decision to license its Dior
trademark for the production of other items, such as household prod-
ucts, towels and sheets, and fragrances. Parfums Christian Dior was
sold to Moët & Chandon in 1971 (after the company made a preliminary
acquisition of shares in 1968). Moët & Chandon also merged with Hen-
nessy in 1971.82 In 1984, when Bernard Arnauld became senior manager
of the fashion and retail company Financière Agache, he terminated all
the licenses of Dior that were harming its image and purchased Louis
Vuitton Moët-Hennessy, which had the Dior fragrances and cosmetics
business. Under the ownership of this global multinational in luxury
products, the brand regained some of its original cachet. 83
Rejuvenation
We noted at the outset that large firms with the organizational skills
and financial resources to rejuvenate brands on a regular basis acquire
brands from small firms. Were rejuvenation simply a matter of “tweak-
ing” the brand image to appeal to a new generation of consumers, a
small family firm might have enough resources to carry out such a task.
If the brand was already profitable, its rejuvenation could be funded
out of retained profits. Only when the aging founder, or his or her suc-
cessors, loses touch with ongoing social trends that influence cus-
tomers might the firm be forced to relinquish control of the brand so
that it can be rejuvenated.
In practice, however, there is often more to rejuvenation than sim-
ply transferring a brand to another owner. Rejuvenation of the brand
may require the development of a global image. As consumers become
increasingly mobile while insisting on instant availability of the products
81 Davis Dyer, Frederick Dalzell, and Rowena Olegario, Rising Tide: Lessons from 165
years of Brand Building at Procter & Gamble (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); “Alan Lafley:
Procter & Gamble veut grandir dans les cosmétiques et les parfums,” Les Echos, 8 Jan. 2003.
82 “JPMW/IS,” Sept. 1984, and “The New Group—Moët Hennessy,” 1971, both at Moët
Hennessy Archives, Epernay; Moët Hennessy, Annual Report and Accounts, 1970–71.
83 “LVMH Drinks to New Shareholders,” Financial Times, 11 July 1988; “France’s Old
Managerial Order Is Changing—A Disputed Touch of Class,” Financial Times, 7 Aug. 1988;
Moët Hennessy, Annual Report and Accounts, 1989.
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they want wherever they are, the ability to meet these demands requires
the support of a global marketing and distribution system.
The traditional market for a brand may stagnate while not al-
together disappearing, or else the traditional product may be unaccept-
able to an emerging market for the brand. If the firm cannot afford to
ignore either market, it will have to extend the brand by creating an ad-
ditional product that meets the requirements of the new market.
Global marketing and distribution channels incur substantial fixed
costs and must handle a large volume of goods, more than any single
product line may supply. This adds another cost-based motive for brand
extension—namely, the need to develop a comprehensive range of prod-
ucts to be sold through similar types of retail outlets whose total vol-
ume will keep a global marketing and distribution center fully utilized.
Smirnoff, the world’s top-selling spirits, is an example of a brand
that has been successfully rejuvenated through globalization and line
extension.84 In 1992, when sales of Smirnoff were maturing in the Brit-
ish market, Grand Metropolitan launched a line extension called “Smir-
noff Mule.” It was a ready-to-drink beverage that reconstituted a cock-
tail prepared in the 1940s by U.S. bartenders, who mixed the vodka
brand with imported ginger ale and lime. This cocktail, called “Moscow
Mule,” went a long way toward establishing Smirnoff as a vodka brand
on the West Coast of the United States.85 The idea was hatched by the
managing director of Heublein’s, who thought he could teach Ameri-
cans to use vodka in mixed drinks. Moscow Mule eventually became
popular in bars all over the United States. The launch in 1992 of Smir-
noff Mule in the United Kingdom as a ready-to-drink beverage was a
response to two problems: the time it took to prepare cocktails at the
bar and their inconsistent quality, which varied according to the skill of
the bartender. These variables often caused consumers to fall back on
drinking beer, as its quality was at least consistent. However, Smirnoff
Mule was unsuccessful. It did not appeal to the target market, and the
bottle design did not correspond to the content of the beverage. This
was, in fact, International Distiller and Vintners’ second unsuccessful
84 Smirnoff was created in 1864 in Russia and was drunk by the royal family. In 1933 a
former U.S. supplier of the brand bought the American rights to produce it. In 1939
Heublein, a U.S. firm that had become the leading multinational in the world by the mid-
1980s, bought the brand. In 1987 Heublein was in financial difficulty and was less and less
able to invest in the brand. Grand Metropolitan, which had the right to distribute Smirnoff in
Europe, saw its potential to become a global brand. After Grand Metropolitan merged with
Guinness to form Diageo, it acquired Heublein in 1997. Thus it came into the hands of the
world’s largest multinational. Smirnoff is now part of a limited number of global priority
brands from which Diageo derives most of its economic profit in several countries. Lopes,
Global Brands.
85 Moscow Mule was first created in 1941; “Moscow Mule File,” Smirnoff Archive, Diageo,
Menstrie, U.K.
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attempt to enter the ready-to-drink market. The company had previ-
ously launched Saint Leger, a California wine cooler conceived as an al-
ternative to wine and beer. The product failed because the company
had not transferred the knowledge it had gained from its wine and spir-
its business to the beer market, nor had it done enough consumer
research.86
These unsuccessful ventures were nonetheless useful learning ex-
periences for the subsequent launch in 2002 of Smirnoff Ice, which be-
came very successful. The Smirnoff Ice promotion relied on different
imagery than had been used to push Smirnoff Mule: it was both less so-
phisticated and tied more closely to the spirits brand. Smirnoff Ice suc-
ceeded to such a degree that it regenerated consumer interest in the
core brand.87
Entrepreneurship and Resources
Since most successful global brands change ownership several times
over the course of their existence, it is important to understand why
this occurs and what is gained by these transitions. Usually the existing
owner lacks the resources to take the next step in the life of the brand,
which would entail either globalizing it or creating new lines or brand
extensions. Recognition of a lack of capacity to exploit the brand to its
full potential may lead to its sale (either on its own or along with the
firm that owns it). The owner may lack either tangible resources (such
as physical assets or capital) or intangible resources (such as knowl-
edge, which, in the case of imagery brands, tends to be marketing
knowledge). Often a combination of these motivations leads to changes
in ownership.88
Marketing Knowledge. The entrepreneur can be a catalyst in the
growth of marketing-based firms. The characteristics of entrepreneurs
involved in the creation of brands tend to be similar, regardless of
whether they own the firm or are employees of a multibrand firm. A
comparison of the characteristics of two entrepreneurs, the creators of
Carlsberg and Nescafé, clearly reveals their similarities. However, over
time, the type of management and marketing knowledge they require
changes substantially. In the initial stages of brands, the entrepreneur-
founders of firms, or their family members, tend to have a pragmatic
86 Interview with Chris Nadin, former marketing manager at Grand Metropolitan, Lon-
don, 10 Dec. 2003.
87 Barwise and Robertson, “Brand Portfolios,” 278; David A. Aaker and Kevin Lane Keller,
“Consumer Evaluations of Brand Extensions,” Journal of Marketing 54 (Jan. 1990): 27–41.
88 David J. Storey, “Firm Performance and Size: Explanations from Small Firm Sectors,”
Small Business 1, no. 3 (1989): 175–80.
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and path-dependent kind of knowledge that has been accumulated over
time. This kind of knowledge is nontransferable, complex, dynamic,
rich in intangible resources, and usually tacit. Its transmission, which is
a source of competitive advantage, requires minimal, barely formalized
expression and is expressed in the individual’s reactions to situations.89
This kind of knowledge often becomes routinized, with the result that
once employees have learned and adjusted to established procedures
they resist learning new ones.
The knowledge that is nontransferable and is accumulated over
time, however, is distinct from the routines and procedures that em-
body the entrepreneur’s perception of business problems and strategic
solutions. This type of knowledge resides in the minds of particular in-
dividuals (such as marketing managers or the firm’s chief executive of-
ficer) and is not as easily shared with other people in the organization.
Routines and procedures allow the company to monitor and cope with
short-term volatility, while knowledge represents a strategic response
to long-term challenges.
The cases we have analyzed reveal that the kind of knowledge dis-
played by hired managers differs from the knowledge possessed by
family members. Managers with entrepreneurial capabilities can be
hired for the short term, and their expertise tends to be broadly appli-
cable. They are usually hired to act as “change agents” and are in-
structed to challenge old procedures. Old, nontransferable knowledge
that produced the success of a particular brand may have become obso-
lete, requiring the formation of new entrepreneurial skills. The charac-
teristics of such managers do not reflect the character of their market-
ing knowledge per se; they have to do with the nature of the practices in
which the knowledge is used.
The process of transmitting new knowledge within the firm occurs
in various ways: by training, by monitoring, and through critical analy-
sis of the mentor who changes the knowledge. This is what happened to
Mr. Gucci, the founder of his own firm, and to his son, who succeeded
him. Another alternative is hiring professionals to manage different
areas of the firm, making sure that they share information and consult
with each other in order to learn their colleagues’ views. Such a process
occurred when KitKat was launched soon after the appointment of a
new manager. While it is relatively easy to find people with professional
89 Explicit knowledge (articulated or codified) can be transferred by way of a systematized
language or code, and there is no need to link it to a specific context for it to be meaningful.
Michael Polany, The Tacit Dimension (London, 1966); Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeu-
chi, The Knowledge-Creating Company (New York, 1995); Ikujiro Nonaka and Noboru
Konno, “The Concept of ‘Ba’: Building a Foundation for Knowledge Creation,” California
Management Review 40 (Spring 1998): 40–54.
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skills (managers with professional accreditation and mastery of mar-
keting techniques), it is more difficult to find entrepreneurs capable of
making difficult judgments and selecting brands with the potential to
be rejuvenated and transformed into successful global brands.
In small firms, entrepreneurs are able to manage both short-term
and long-term volatility. As firms grow, a succession of immediate cri-
ses often erupts that can prevent the entrepreneur from thinking about
the long term. Because short-term volatility is recurrent, however, rou-
tines and procedures can be devised to meet it. The skills for doing so
are acquired by good professionals, and professionals move between
firms. Having gained the confidence of the shareholders, the entrepre-
neur CEO can become more specialized and concentrate on long-term
trends. He or she now has the space in which to develop expertise in
valuing brands and calculating potential future earnings.
As Schumpeter stated, “Mechanisms of economic change in capi-
talist society pivot on entrepreneurial activity.”90 The reason for this
is that the qualities of decision-makers are partly determined by, and
partly determine, the social environment within which business takes
place. Similarly, the value of marketing knowledge changes with trans-
formations in the environment, and firms are only able to succeed by
adapting, keeping routines and procedures that are still relevant and
discarding those that are not.
Before they became globally successful, the brands we have ana-
lyzed here survived as a result of continual small adjustments, enabling
entrepreneurs to preserve their basic routines and procedures. More
radical changes in the environment, such as increased competition and
liberalized markets (characterized by different preferences and distinct
cultures), forced the entrepreneurs to become more flexible and to ac-
quire new forms of marketing knowledge in order to rejuvenate their
brands and change their routines and procedures.91
The Life of Brands and Marketing Knowledge. Several research-
ers in marketing, international business, and strategy have linked the
stages in the life of products and industries to the strategies followed by
firms at particular times.92 However, these studies do not address how
to rejuvenate brands at different stages in their lives, nor do they exam-
ine which entrepreneurs and firms should own these brands at differ-
ent times and in particular locations.
90 Schumpeter, “The Creative Response.”
91 This view contrasts with that of Schumpeter, who considers the entrepreneur to be the
one who initiates economic change and thinks that consumers are taught to want new things.
Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development, 65–94.
92 See for example Raymon Vernon, “International Investment and International Trade
in Product Cycle,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 80 (May 1966): 190–207.
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The evidence we have provided shows an apparent relationship
among entrepreneurship, the life of firms, and the life of brands. Early
stages in the life of a brand require marketing knowledge, which is es-
sentially nontransferable, pragmatic, and dependent on the ideas of the
entrepreneur who created it. At this stage, the brand is essentially local,
although it might have been adopted in countries that are culturally
and geographically close. Over time, as a result of its natural path of
growth, the increasingly homogenized makeup of its consumers, and
the liberalization of its markets, the brand will have to be sold in multi-
ple markets around the world. This step requires gathering more mar-
keting knowledge and assembling a team of professional managers to
investigate the particular requirements of different markets. In some
cases, the family will hire teams of managers; in others, it makes more
sense to sell out to companies that already have such managers.
In its early stages, a brand may remain successful if the firm hires
more staff who are taught the routines and procedures created by the
entrepreneur. For the brand to become global, the firm must acquire a
more expansive type of marketing knowledge, often by hiring profes-
sional marketing managers with entrepreneurial skills, bringing in exter-
nal consultants, or forming alliances with multinationals. These strate-
gies enable the firm to use its skills for the international management
of its successful brands. If that is not possible, the firm might sell the
brand to another firm with the necessary resources. Often firms with
this type of marketing knowledge find they can extend it to different
brands. In these circumstances, they will probably search for new
brands with the potential to become global to add to their portfolios.
Conclusion
In this study, we have looked at the role of entrepreneurship in the
growth and survival of global brands in food and drink and in the cos-
metics and fashion industries. Drawing on an expanded concept of the
entrepreneur, we have considered the self-made entrepreneur (who has
a strong will to succeed) and the hired organization manager (who pos-
sesses above-average leadership qualities, who is not afraid of challenges,
and who has an inner drive to compete and win). Our cross-industry
and cross-country comparisons highlighted several salient trends, some
of which can be attributed to the life of brands and others to the devel-
opment of the modern economy.
One noticeable trend is that successful global brands usually origi-
nate in developed countries, where the institutional environment tends
to be more benign (in terms of legislation, consumption, infrastructures,
and capital); another is that most successful brands are old, often dating
Entrepreneurship and the Development of Global Brands / 679
back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as it takes a long time
to build their personalities and it is easier to create brand and line ex-
tensions than to start from scratch. Few brands have remained under
the same ownership throughout their lives, particularly since the
1980s. The liberalization of markets led to new waves of mergers and
acquisitions and to global economies. Many brands are now under the
ownership of a small group of multinationals in consumer goods. The
ownership of these brands and of the firms that created them tends to
change with repeated mergers and acquisitions. However, a few brands
were traded as pieces of intellectual property. Licensing agreements are
also common (for the production and distribution of a different prod-
uct that uses the same brand name as another or for selling the same
product in a different geographic market) for fixed periods of time.
These agreements are often linked to strategies of brand extensions.
We have shown that once a brand has been successfully created
and built up by the original entrepreneurs who had the ideas and the
willingness to take risks, it is more likely to continue to flourish when it
is turned over to professional managers with entrepreneurial skills
(and marketing knowledge that has a broader application).
The evolution of brands from local to global may take place within
a single firm, if the firm, for instance, hires new managers with entre-
preneurial skills or consultants who can give advice on how to rejuve-
nate brands (in which case, the brand may remain under the same own-
ership throughout its life). Alternatively, and most frequently, in order
to remain successful and expand, ownership of the brand might have to
change. Ensuring its acceptance in a range of countries as the brand
grows requires the application of a considerable amount of informa-
tion. Neither a single individual nor a small firm based in one country
can accomplish this alone. Large organizations are better able to create
the environment that allows teams of professional managers to behave
entrepreneurially. These managers are often employed by an entrepre-
neurial individual who understands what they can contribute. While
the entrepreneur may be qualified in marketing, he or she understands
the advantages of delegating the task to other professionals.
Rejuvenation and globalization require different skills. At these
stages, entrepreneurs manifest exploitative behavior, such as the abil-
ity, first, to recognize trends in the global economy and, then, to apply
this recognition to best advantage in the appropriate sector when pro-
moting the brand. The skills of explorative entrepreneurs are more im-
portant during stages when the development of the product is associ-
ated with a particular brand that becomes successful later on.
To remain “forever young,” imagery brands (in food and drink,
cosmetics and fashion) do not necessarily have to be owned by large
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Chandlerian managerial firms, at least initially. The situation differs in
the case of performance brands, where factors such as technological in-
novation must be taken into consideration.
Our findings may be applied to other industries, such as many in
consumer goods whose leaders are also multibrand firms, whereas
high-tech manufacturing industries often consist of single-brand firms.
Consumer goods and services in industries that do not embody ad-
vanced manufacturing technologies, such as the hotel industry, gener-
ally provide an opportunity to separate brand ownership from firm
ownership, thereby allowing separate trade. When it comes to high-
tech, single-brand firms, however, the ideas we have presented require
some modification, as it is not so easy to separate the brand from the
firm when the brand must be kept up to date. Where advanced technol-
ogy is required to sustain the quality of the brand on which its reputa-
tion is based, it is difficult to separate the brand and the firm, because
the acquiring firm would have to have the appropriate advanced tech-
nology and skills required to continue to keep the technology current.
Although this stricture does not prevent brands from being traded, it
does severely limit the range of potential buyers.
